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TOWARDS CRAIGAVON: THE ‘NEW CITY’ IN COUNTY ARMAGH IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT*1 
 
The historical context to the creation of Craigavon in the 1960s is intimately related to the 
changing dynamics of the principal urban area in Northern Ireland and the priorities identified 
by politicians and policymakers within central government in response to the challenges of 
Belfast’s modernisation. Thus, the New City in County Armagh was initially conceived as a 
means of addressing the real (and perceived) problems of the Belfast region, utilising 
techniques already tried-and-tested in Great Britain via the state-led New Town programme. 
The relationship of Craigavon to Belfast, therefore, is akin to that of Stevenage and Milton 
Keynes to London, and Cumbernauld and East Kilbride to Glasgow, and its history is ultimately 
bound up in the larger story of the creation of post war new towns and emergent thinking on 
strategic planning in the UK. However, Craigavon and other twentieth century new towns also 
represented the culmination of older ideas derived from utopian thinkers, social reformers and 
industrial philanthropists, particularly in the nineteenth century, and their back-story can only 
fully be understood with reference to these earlier influences and influencers. The ‘seers’, as 
Peter Hall (2002, p.27) labelled the pioneering thinkers on urban planning, could not have 
envisaged how their ideas would travel, mutate and be implemented differentially over time, 
and between places, while continuing to retain relevancy into the 21st century. 
 
This article is primarily focused on Craigavon before it became Craigavon. That is, before the 
New City was named, controversially, in early 1965, and prior to its official designation by the 
Northern Ireland Government under the New Towns Act (Northern Ireland) in 1965. As such, 
the article is largely concerned with Craigavon as it remained ‘on the page’ and in the 
imagination of those who initially proposed it – principally the Scottish architect-planner 
Robert Matthew and senior civil servants in Stormont, backed by Terence O’Neill. This 
approach neatly facilitates the bypassing of some of the controversial aspects of its naming and 
uneven development on the ground. Rather, the article provides historical context beginning 
with the nineteenth and early-twentieth century development of Model Villages and Garden 
Cities before focusing on the post-war New Town programme in Great Britain. The second half 
of the article addresses the advent of regional planning in Northern Ireland and the work of 
Robert Matthew, whose identification of the area between Portadown and Lurgan set in motion 
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the process leading up to Craigavon’s official designation in 1965. The initial stages in the New 
City’s development are then discussed, with the ideas and actions of its first Chief Designer, 
Geoffrey Copcutt, outlined before converging on some of the problems that dogged the project 
from an early stage.  
 
Model Villages and Garden Cities 
 
The pioneers of the early town planning movement, whose ideas would prove inspirational for 
new town proponents in the mid-twentieth century, are closely associated with the settlements 
known as Model Villages and Garden Cities. The former includes such places as Bourneville, 
outside Birmingham, and Port Sunlight, near Liverpool, respectively developed from the late 
1870s (Port Sunlight begun in 1888) by the Quaker and chocolate manufacturer, George 
Cadbury, and the chemical (and soap) magnate William Lever. The latter category is 
represented by Letchworth (founded 1903) and Welwyn (founded 1920), both located in the 
English county of Hertfordshire, whose creation in the early twentieth century was led by one 
of the most celebrated influences on modern town and country planning, Ebenezer Howard. 
Model Villages and Garden Cities share many common characteristics, not least the fact that 
they were deliberately sited in the countryside to avoid the ‘evils’ of the industrial-era Victorian 
city and its attendant overcrowding, poor housing conditions, pollution, diseases and other vices 
– in contrast to the somewhat idealised virtues of a rural existence. Furthermore, the segregation 
of industrial from residential uses, lower density housing (often designed in a picturesque style), 
accommodating space for gardens and allotments, and the provision of recreational and other 
facilities for residents, set within an embryonic ‘green belt’ of agricultural land, are defining 
shared characteristics. However, Garden Cities were not intended to function according to the 
same moral precepts that were at the forefront of the thinking of several Model Village founders 
concerning, for example, the absence of public houses and pawnshops. 
 
The Garden City ideas promoted by Howard are further distinguished from Model Villages in 
that they represented a step up in terms of scale, ambition and thinking on how such places 
could be realised. For instance, Model Villages were essentially one-off settlements created 
(and initially owned) by industrialists to house workers close to their factories. Thus, the ‘social 
experiment’ of Bessbrook in County Armagh, rightly identified by Camblin (1951) as an earlier 
example than Saltaire in Yorkshire, was built by John Grubb Richardson from the mid-1840s 
to accommodate workers in his adjacent mill. By contrast, Garden Cities were not tied to 
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specific industries or industrialists and the private companies established to purchase land and 
advance their development instead sought to attract both a range of new employers and 
inhabitants. Furthermore, Garden Cities were conceived within a broader framework of action 
advocated by the Town and Country Planning Association (initially called the Garden City 
Association), which Howard established in 1899. In particular, Howard illustrated his ideas and 
envisaged their realisation on a regional scale, encapsulating the key concepts in the ‘Three 
Magnets’ (Figure 1) and ‘Social City’ diagrams (Figure 2). The former identifies the advantages 
and disadvantages of urban and rural life, superimposing the descriptors employed over two 
magnets, with a third magnate indicating that a new type of settlement – the Garden City – 
could combine the accessibility and environmental qualities of ‘town-country’. As individual 
garden cities reached their target population of 30,000 people, Howard proposed that new 
settlements would be formed nearby, eventually agglomerating into a so-called Social City. 
Notwithstanding the prescriptive and paternalistic nature of this conception, and the fact that 
only two Garden Cities were established during his lifetime due to financial pressures, 
Howard’s ideas attracted influential followers who would transpose his thinking into post-war 
government policy. 
 
Figure 1: The Three Magnets diagram published in Howard’s Tomorrow: a Peaceful Path to 
Real Reform in 1898. This book was republished in 1902 using a different, and better-known, 
title: Garden Cities of To-morrow.  
 
Figure 2: The Social City envisaged by Howard in Tomorrow: a Peaceful Path to Real Reform. 
Note that this diagram did not feature in the republished version in 1902.  
 
Post-war New Towns 
 
Many of the Garden City ideals found their ultimate expression in the post war years following 
the establishment of a comprehensive system of town and country planning in the UK. The 
necessity to rebalance the national economy away from the dominant (and overpopulated) 
London and the south east of England, in addition to progressing the rebuilding of war-ravaged 
cities and slum clearance programmes, persuaded politicians to support the construction of new 
settlements under the 1946 New Towns Act (with separate legislation in Scotland). The eminent 
architect-planner Patrick Abercrombie, in his Greater London Plan of 1944, had already 
visualised how a million people could be dispersed from Inner-London and accommodated in 
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satellite towns, fulfilling, in the words of Hall (2002, p.64), ‘the principles that Ebenezer 
Howard…established nearly half a century before’. The Minister of Town and Country 
Planning, Lewis Silkin, swiftly confirmed Stevenage as the first new town under the 1946 Act, 
and a further thirteen were designated in England and Wales by 1950, including Harlow, 
Hatfield and Basildon. A key provision of the Act was that state development corporations, 
with access to long-term loans, be established to plan and build each new town, with the 
intention that they be wound-up upon completion. Other innovations included the use of 
experimental designs and building materials, the adoption of the ‘neighbourhood unit’ principle 
for residential areas, and the pedestrianisation of town centres. 
 
The rollout of new towns in Great Britain did not proceed uncontroversily, however, and certain 
arguments were aired that would resurface over Craigavon in the 1960s. These ranged from the 
loss of good agricultural land to low-density housing, the initial failure to create a sense of 
community resulting in ‘new towns blues’, to the bypassing of local democratic accountability 
by the new development corporations – local protesters mockingly dubbed Stevenage 
‘Silkingrad’ after the government minister. As a consequence of these criticisms and 
interchanging Conservative and Labour administrations with differing ideological perspectives 
on the role of the state, the second (smaller) wave of new towns was only designated from the 
mid-1950s. From the ‘Mark II’ new towns, the denser, linear development of Cumbernauld in 
central Scotland, is perhaps the best known, particularly for its pioneering centre comprising a 
single, multi-level, concrete ‘brutalist’ megastructure on stilts above a dual-carriageway (Figure 
3). The segregation of vehicular traffic from walkers and cyclists was pioneered in 
Cumbernauld, with the masterplan more attuned to rising car ownership levels than earlier new 
town designs. Importantly, from the perspective of Northern Ireland, the ‘flamboyant but highly 
unstable’ mastermind of Cumbernauld’s town centre, Geoffrey Copcutt, would feature 
prominently in the early history of the New City in County Armagh (Glendinning, 2008, p.333). 
Indeed, even when ensconced in Northern Ireland from 1963, Copcutt kept a portable model of 
Cumbernauld town centre close at hand in his car, and it remained a key reference point for his 
work on the New City.  
 
Figure 3: An aerial view of Cumbernauld Town Centre. Taken from the JR James Slide 
Collection under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 license. 
 




Robert Matthew is synonymous with the advent of regional planning in Northern Ireland and 
his work on the Belfast Regional Survey and Plan 1962 (Figure 4) informed the selection of a 
site between Lurgan and Portadown for the New City. Matthew’s previous involvement on the 
Clyde Valley Regional Plan in the 1940s (with Abercrombie), together with the fact that he was 
a ‘Presbyterian Scot’, bolstered his commissioning by the Ministry of Health and Local 
Government in March 1960, in spite of the Unionist Party’s previous antipathy towards 
planning.1 In appointing Matthew as an independent arbiter, Stormont officials sought to diffuse 
tensions with Belfast Corporation over the vexed issue of housing, partially through locating 
the future development of the city within a planned regional context and as a counter-point to 
the council’s repeated requests for a boundary extension. Matthew’s recommendations 
embraced the imposition of a ‘stop line’ around the urban area to prevent further sprawl while 
simultaneously protecting the ‘green-scape’ surrounding the city. Further measures aimed at 
‘demagnetising’ the city – echoing the language first used by Howard in describing his Garden 
City ideals – included the designation as growth centres of a group of existing towns within a 
30-mile radius to accommodate new industries and the ‘overspill’ population from ‘slum 
clearance’. The most significant proposal, however, was the creation of a New City in County 
Armagh for 100,000 people by 1981. Crucially, within months of Matthew’s recommendations 
being made public, Terence O’Neill became Prime Minister and swiftly endorsed them as part 
of his wider agenda to modernise the Northern Ireland economy (in addition to defeating the 
electoral challenge of the Northern Ireland Labour Party). A New City design team, with 
Copcutt as Chief Designer, was assembled in skeletal form by late 1963 to press ahead with 
preliminary proposals, paving the way for the official designation and creation of the Craigavon 
Development Commission under proposed legislation.  
 
Figure 4: The front cover of the Belfast Regional Survey and Plan 1962, published in this 
format in 1964. 
 
The New City in County Armagh  
 
The appointment of Copcutt occurred somewhat fortuitously, or not, depending on your 
perspective, with senior figures at Cumbernauld apparently delighted to facilitate his departure 
elsewhere (Glendinning, 2008). Given the dearth of planners and design professionals in 
Northern Ireland at the time, it was not surprising that British and international expertise would 
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be attracted and welcomed to work on the New City project. Although the Design Team had 
little say over the ultimate location of the New City, Copcutt’s pursuit of the principle of linear 
growth is clearly identifiable in the master plan, whereby communities are located along key 
communications spines (road, rail networks etc.), with flexibility allowed for further expansion 
along the spine (Figure 5). In particular, it was envisaged that the ‘motor-car city’, as Craigavon 
was intended to become, would incorporate a hierarchical and high-capacity system of roads 
connected into a regional motorway network, with vehicular traffic within the city totally 
segregated from pedestrians and cyclists. The First Report on the Proposed New City illustrated 
the key design principles, including zoning into main centres and ‘Town Units’, with the latter 
intended to be large enough (16,000-20,000 population at low densities) to support basic social 
and commercial facilities; to help develop a sense of community; and, to be within reasonable 
walking distance of the city centre. The initial creation of two Town Units between Portadown 
and Lurgan would eventually be supplemented by others as the New City gained in popularity 
– Brownlow was the only unit to be substantially built. However, as proved the case with other 
large-scale modernist projects of the 1960s, the best intentions of the designers as they imagined 
the New City conflicted with the somewhat messier reality of implementation.  
 
Figure 5: Outline plan of the New City as envisaged in 1964. Taken from First Report on the 
Proposed New City, Co. Armagh. 
 
Early signs of discontent with the project devastatingly emerged before the First Report was 
even published, and from an unexpected and high-level source: Copcutt. In a 7,000-word 
resignation memo sent to the government and main regional newspapers in August 1964, 
Copcutt critiqued the entire rationale for the New City, which he considered should be 
abandoned in favour of developing Belfast, Londonderry and other places.2 Stormont officials, 
although publically exuding calm at this stark turn of events, were ‘severely rattled’ in private 
(Glendinning, 2008, p.337). Belfast Corporation and others already vehemently opposed to the 
New City were emboldened; for instance, councillors on Armagh Urban District Council called 
for the project to be abandoned (Figure 6). While Nationalist politicians had been sceptical from 
the outset – Gerry Fitt suggested that the New City should be called ‘Disneyland’ – Unionist 
opinion in rural county Armagh and the west of Northern Ireland was increasingly divided over 
the long-term implications. Correspondence in December 1964 over the First Report between 
the Secretary of Armagh County Council, Harold Reid, and John Oliver of the Ministry of 
Health and Local Government, provides an insight into the emerging grounds for contestation, 
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including over the feared depopulation of rural areas, the compulsory purchase of land and 
compensation, and suspicions over the power that ‘experts’ and ‘planners’ had over the lives of 
local people.3 The latter two issues came to dominate protests against ‘government authority’, 
particularly following the vesting by the Ministry of Development of a large swathe of land to 
accommodate the development. Then, in January 1965, the New City was named after the first 
Unionist Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, James Craig, in spite of the reservations held by 
O’Neill and his closest supporters. The Craigavon brand was evidently badly damaged before 
a sod had even been turned. 
 
Figure 6: Armagh Guardian newspaper headline on 20 August 1964 in the immediate aftermath 
of Copcutt’s resignation. 
 
A series of other reforms proposed by the Northern Ireland Government in the mid-1960s only 
served to amplify the rising discontent surrounding the New City project. Firstly, the related 
issues of local government reform and the introduction of comprehensive town and country 
planning legislation were successfully opposed for almost a decade. Indeed, four Unionist MPs 
refused to support the Government over the passage of the New Towns Act (Northern Ireland) 
in 1965, while several Stormont ministers voiced their opposition to the creation of a Ministry 
of Development to centrally manage strategic planning initiatives. All these were initially 
proposed in the Matthew Plan, and supported by O’Neill, but they exposed the fragility of 
reform processes that threatened the transformation of established political practices at the local 
level. Secondly, within a month of the Craigavon naming in early 1965 the Lockwood 
Committee reported on the siting of a second university in Northern Ireland. Matthew wanted 
it built in the New City, while others proposed its founding within the grounds of the Primate’s 
Palace in Armagh.4 However, the failure to select Derry as the preferred location, in favour of 
the small Protestant-majority town of Coleraine, unsurprisingly provoked a storm of protest. 
Copcutt’s resignation, for Glendinning (2008, p.337-338), dramatically brought to the fore how 
controversies surrounding regional planning and decision-making could ‘do damage to 
O’Neill’s wider agenda of “reform, reconciliation, economic and social equality”’. Such 






Craigavon remained a ‘ghost town’ in the late 1960s. The visionary plans of those who 
conceived the New City in County Armagh were unlikely to flourish in the context of escalating 
civil unrest and ‘the Troubles’, particularly following the early critiques which framed a 
narrative of failure that subsequently dogged the project. However, the New City project in its 
first decade shares two critical issues in common with other places in the twentieth century. 
Firstly, utopian projects that are large-scale and long-term in their implementation are 
inevitably subject, for good or ill, to the vagaries of time and uncontrollable ‘events’. For 
instance, the violence that quickly hastened the collapse of the first period of devolved 
government in Northern Ireland also precipitated local government reform and the winding up 
of Craigavon Development Commission in 1973. None of these eventualities could have been 
foreseen in the relative optimism of the early 1960s, but the dynamics driving forward the New 
City project were irretrievably lost in the maelstrom. Secondly, the necessity to plan with the 
people rather than for was also starkly exposed by the reactions against the project and the 
vesting of farmland. As Morrison (2006, p.147) argues, the Matthew Plan was ‘cavalier in the 
way it dealt with people’, and the technocratic approach that characterised many planning 
initiatives in the UK and elsewhere were increasingly challenged by the communities most 
impacted. It is no surprise that the ground-breaking Skeffington Report, People and Planning: 
Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning, was published in 1969 and 
explored such emotive concerns. 
 
Craigavon may be synonymous for some with roundabouts, and, as Johnston (2015, p.24) notes, 
‘is often the butt of jokes’, but the ultimate failure to implement many of the original design 
intentions need not define it indefinitely in the public mind. As this article has sought to convey, 
the New City is enmeshed within a wider story of the historical development of utopian thinking 
on town and country planning from the nineteenth century to the present, and it represents an 
interesting example of how these ideas were interpreted differently in diverse geographic, 
political and cultural contexts. The New City was at the epicentre of regional planning in 
Northern Ireland in the 1960s, intimately associated with the work of several eminent and 
enigmatic twentieth century architect-planners who continue to fascinate historians. Its most 
innovative design ideas also remain highly relevant today, and it is instructive to consider that 
many cities around the world, including Belfast, are attempting to create the sort of segregated 
cycling and walking greenways that Craigavon had since its inception. It is also continuing to 
physically evolve, with new homes, businesses and leisure facilities, very different in form to 
those proposed in the 1960s, emerging over recent decades, largely constructed by the private 
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sector in a further deviation from the original state-led development model. The centenary of 
Craigavon in another 50 years will again give cause to reflect on the experiences of the 
intervening period.  
 
Andrew McClelland is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at Maynooth 
University, County Kildare. He was born in Craigavon Area Hospital.	This article is partly 
based on a lecture given in May 2016 as part of Armagh City Banbridge & Craigavon Borough 




Camblin, G. (1951) The Town in Ulster, Belfast: Mullan 
 
Glendinning, M. (2008) Modern architect: the life and times of Robert Matthew, London: RIBA 
 
Hall, P. (2002) Urban and Regional Planning, 4th Edition, London and New York: Routledge 
 
Johnston, W. (2015) ‘Craigavon’s Roads’, in R. McCabe (ed) Creating Craigavon, pp.22-24, 
Belfast: PLACE on behalf of Craigavon Borough Council  
 
Matthew, R.H. (1964) Belfast Regional Survey and Plan 1962, Belfast: HMSO 
 
Morrison, B. (2006) ‘Planning the City; Planning the Region’, in F.W. Boal and S.A. Royle 
(eds) Enduring City: Belfast in the Twentieth Century, pp.141-154, Belfast: Blackstaff Press 
 
Mulholland, M. (2013) Terence O’Neill, Dublin: UCD Press on behalf of the Historical 
Association of Ireland 
 
New City Design Group (1964) First Report on the Proposed New City, Co. Armagh, Belfast: 
HMSO 
 
O’Neill, T. (1972) The Autobiography of Terence O’Neill, London: Hart-Davis 
10 
	
1 The former Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Lord Brookeborough, was openly hostile to the idea 
of planning, which he considered a ‘socialist menace’ (O’Neill, 1972, p.47). 
2 Copcutt also attacked bureaucratic interference in the work of the design team and the growing 
influence of sectarian politics on the New City project. 
3 See Public Record Office of Northern Ireland file no. LA/2/3/AG/72. 
4 Armagh Urban District Council and Armagh County Council submitted a joint bid for the second 
university.	
																																																								
